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Much has been written about the polarization of the American electorate and its reflection in its legislatures, 
but less about its spatial polarization, which Bishop has argued has taken place in parallel with the ideological 
and behavioural polarization. The extent of that polarization can be assessed, he argues, by identifying the 
number of ‘landslide counties, those won at presidential elections by margins of 20 percentage points or more. 
This paper looks at the change in the number and extent of those landslide counties over the period 1992-
2016, relative to both the location of the counties and their population composition, using multilevel 
modelling. It shows that a county’s population composition was a major determinant of whether it returned a 
landslide for either party’s candidate at any election – with a clear change in direction over the period for 
counties according to their level of affluence – but this was by no means the sole determinant. Holding 
constant those variations there were additional geographies that were more place- than people-specific. 
 




The ideological polarization of the American population and its elected representatives has been the 
source of much recent debate – as in Campbell’s (2016, 1) recent conclusion that ‘America is 
polarized. Our political parties are highly polarized and the American electorate is highly polarized. … 
Political divisions in American politics are now deep and real’. That polarization is not as extreme as 
in some countries: it distinguishes liberals from conservatives (with a substantial moderate minority 
between them), not totalitarians from anarchists. The core American values remain – peace and 
prosperity, equal opportunities etc. – but liberals and conservatives differ significantly on the means 
to those ends, and the variations in their ideological commitments to those means have become 
deeper in recent decades. 
 
Linked to that work on greater ideological polarization among the American electorate and its 
representatives are parallel arguments about spatial polarization of the electorate. Over recent 
decades, it is argued, the country has become geographically more polarized, with more areas 
increasingly dominated by support for either the Democratic or the Republican candidate for the 
presidency. A major figure in this argument has been a journalist, Bill Bishop, whose 2008 book with 
Robert Cushing – reprinted and updated in 2009 – on The Big Sort had an opening chapter entitled 
‘The age of political segregation’. After the traumatic events of 1968, he claimed, the country 
became increasingly polarized as similar people concentrated even more into particular areas, hence 
(Bishop, 2009, 40): 
The country may be more diverse than ever coast to coast. But look around: our own streets 
are filled with people who live alike, think alike, and vote alike. This social transformation 
didn’t happen by accident. We have built a country where everyone can choose the 
neighborhood (and church and news shows) most compatible with his or her lifestyle and 
beliefs. And we are living with the consequences of this segregation by way of life: pockets 
of like-minded citizens that have become so identically inbred that we don’t know, can’t 
understand and can barely conceive of “those people” who live just a few miles away. 
Selective migration, according to this hypothesis, is leading to a more segregated country, a situation 
exacerbated recently by gerrymandering which, by refusing to find egregious gerrymanders 
unconstitutional, a Supreme Court 2006 decision has encouraged (McGann et al., 2016; Daley, 




ideologically relatively extreme candidates in their primaries, so contributing to greater ideological 
polarization in the House of Representatives. 
 
Most of Bishop’s book advances his argument through qualitative data and case studies, but he 
claims that Cushing sustained the argument by testing it using all of the ‘several ways to measure 
segregation’ (p.9) devised by demographers. His conclusion was further sustained by use of more 
recently-developed measures that evaluate the degree of segregation at three spatial scales 
(Johnston et al., 2016). Since 1992, the pattern of voting at Presidential elections has become 
increasingly more polarized across the nine divisions deployed by the Bureau of the Census for much 
statistical presentation; additionally, it has become more polarized across the states within those 
divisions, as well as across the counties (or county-equivalents) within states. 
 
With that statistical basis for his argument in the background, Bishop (p.9) argued that the 
… simplest way to describe this political big sort was to look across time at the proportion of 
voters who lived in landslide counties – counties where one party won by 20 percentage 
points or more. 
The number of such counties, and the share of the voting population living there, varied across the 
elections that he studied – from 1948 to 2004 (with a brief update for 2008). In what he terms 
uncompetitive elections – ‘when the entire country seemed to side with one party or the other’ – as 
many as 55 (1984), 59 (1972) and 64 (1964) per cent of the voting population lived in counties where 
the winning candidate for the presidency from the two main parties (Republican and Democratic) 
led his opponent by 20 percentage points or more. In competitive elections, when the winning 
candidate’s margin was less than 10 points nationally, that percentage was only 27 in 1974, but by 
2004 it had increased to 48: nearly half of those who turned out to vote lived in counties won by a 
landslide, creating what he termed a ‘fractured, discordant country’ (p.15). 
 
Bishop’s argument has come under some criticism, but not outright rejection. Prior to the 
appearance of his book, Fiorina and Abrams (2008), for example, referred to some of his journalism 
which presaged his later argument that ‘most Americans are living in communities that are 
becoming politically more homogeneous … and that grouping of like-minded people is feeding the 
nation’s rancorous and partisan politics’.1 Reviewing the small literature on geographical 
polarization, they note that most of it relates to election returns rather than measures of individuals’ 
partisan positions and that little of it provides strong evidence of any polarization trend. (This 
includes an analysis by Glaeser and Ward, 2006, which showed little more than trendless fluctuation 
over the period 1860-1976, but from 1976 to 2004 it showed a steady increase, with their 
polarization measure more than doubling over the period.) Further, they conclude that election 
outcomes are ‘not measures of voter positions and cannot be used as indicators of such’ (Fiorina and 
Abrams, 2008, 577), implicitly arguing that even if analysis of election returns shows greater 
polarization this cannot be used to imply that people with similar views are congregating together. 
In a later paper, relating directly to Bishop’s (2009) book, they rehearse similar arguments (Abrams 
and Fiorina, 2012). Their conclusion is not a complete rejection: 
There is no evidence that a geographic partisan “big sort” like that described by Bishop is 
ongoing, and even if it were, its effects would be far less important than Bishop and those 
who support his thesis fear. (Abrams and Fiorina, 2012, 208). 
They accept – as do Campbell (2016) and many others – that the American electorate is becoming 
more polarized but ‘however important or troubling … [that] may be, such trends are independent of 
geographic political sorting’ (Abrams and Fiorina, 2012, 208; their emphasis) 
 
ELECTORAL LANDSLIDES IN AMERICAN COUNTIES 
                                                          
1 The quotation, on p. 576 of Fiorina and Abrams’ (2008) paper is taken from B. Bishop, ‘The cost of political 





Abrams and Fiorina’s overall case is that: 
Do the preceding analyses prove that political residential segregation is not occurring? No. 
That is not our position. We are simply pointing out that Bishop’s sweeping argument about 
geographical political sorting has no empirical foundation. (Abrams and Fiorina, 2012, 206). 
They are sceptical that geographical polarization is occurring (has occurred over recent presidential 
elections): their 2008 conclusion was that ‘… geographical polarization – the hypothesized tendency 
of like-minded people to cluster together – remains an open question’ (Fiorina and Abrams, 2008, 
563). Even if it is, however, they reject Bishop’s argument that this is because people with similar 
ideological positions are increasingly segregating themselves from those with other positions. The 
two are separate. Bishop makes strong empirical claims regarding the first – geographical 
polarization. If those can be sustained through rigorous analysis, they the raise important questions 
regarding the sorting processes that are going on and their implications for other forms of 
polarization. This paper is concerned entirely with that first set of claims, with a rigorous statistical 
analysis of the changing geography of landslide counties over the period 1992-2016. 
 
Table 1 shows the number of landslide counties for each of the two main parties, plus the number 
that were not won by a landslide majority, at each of the presidential elections since 1992 covering 
counties in all states except Alaska; the District of Columbia is also excluded.2 Over that twenty-four- 
year period there have been three major changes: the number of counties won by a landslide by the 
Republican candidate increased almost threefold, from 588 to 2,217; the number won by the 
Democratic party candidate almost halved; and the number of counties not won by a landslide also 
declined, to less than one-third of its 1992 total. There was a slight hiatus in those trends in 2008 – 
Barack Obama’s first victory – but they were reinstated again in 2012. At the county scale, the 
country has become much more polarized: in 1992, 64 per cent of all counties were won by less than 
the landslide 20 per cent margin, whereas in 2016 that was the case in only 21 per cent. In terms of 
the number of counties that greater polarization strongly favours the Republicans: their candidate 
won 53 per cent of the landslide counties in 1992, but 91 per cent of them in 2016. 
 
These paper looks at those trends in the number and location of landslide counties in more detail. It 
follows Bishop in defining them – the counties where one party predominated at a particular 
election – as those won by more than twenty points as a share of the total number of votes won 
there by the Democratic and Republican party candidates, thereby removing from the calculations 
all ‘third party’ candidates. Any choice of a threshold between landslide and non-landslide counties 
is necessarily arbitrary, but 20 per cent is useful because very few counties won by that margin by 
one party are later won by the opposing party. For example, of the 588 Republican landslide 
counties in 1992, none were won by the Democratic candidate in 1996, and of the 526 Democratic 
landslide counties at the first date only one was won by the Republican candidate four years later. At 
subsequent elections, almost no counties that returned a Republican landslide then delivered a 
Democratic victory at the following contest. Indeed, of the 588 Republican landslide counties in 
1992, only seven returned a majority for the Democratic party’s candidate 24 years later in 2016. A 
very similar pattern applies to Democratic landslide counties also, with one exception: of the 544 
counties returning a Democratic landslide in 1996, 95 provided a majority for the Republican 
candidate in 2000. Most of those counties were in southern states, notably Arkansas, where Bill 
Clinton won by a landslide in 17 of his home state counties that gave a majority to George W. Bush 
in 2000, and neighbouring states such as Kentucky, Louisiana, and Oklahoma. 
 
                                                          
2 There is no consistency in the county-equivalent subdivisions of Alaska over the period: the District of 
Columbia has no subdivisions. The data used here are a bespoke set showing presidential voting for a 
consistent set of counties for the period 1992-2016 inclusive, constructed by Clark Archer, Fred Shelley and 




Where are those ‘landslide counties’, and what are the characteristics of their populations? Initial 
cartographic analysis identifies very clear patterns. Figure 1 shows the counties according to the 
number of landslides delivered for each party across all seven elections. The core area for 
Republican landslides, with six or seven landslides, covers many of the states of the Great Plains and 
the Mountains, and this expanded south into much of Texas (where Republican candidate in 2000 
and 2004 – George W. Bush – had been governor) and westward into inland California, Oregon and 
Washington. There was also considerable expansion of the areas of Republican hegemony to the 
east of the Mississippi-Missouri rivers, mainly to the west of the Appalachians, but in substantial 
parts of the Upper Midwest (Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin) few counties delivered 
more than one landslide most of them in 2016. Counties that delivered regular landslide victories to 
the Democratic party candidates were increasingly concentrated on the seaboards, plus along the 
border with Mexico, in some inland metropolitan areas (such as Chicago), parts of Arizona and New 
Mexico (which have large Hispanic populations) and in parts of the ‘Black Belt’ along the lower 
Mississippi. But the latter was a major area of change: in Arkansas Bill Clinton won by a landslide in 
45 of his home state’s 75 counties in 1992 and 48 in 1996; Al Gore won just eight by a landslide 
there in 2000, and Hillary Clinton only two in 2016. No Arkansas county delivered a landslide 
majority to the Republican candidate in 1992; 60 did in 2016. 
 
As one candidate expressed it, by 2016 ‘Purple America has all but disappeared’; most of the 
country’s map by county was either red – safe Republican – or blue – safe Democrat. And because 
there were many more red than blue counties the implication was that not only did an ever-
decreasing share of the electorate live in counties won by less than 20 percentage point margins but 
the same was the case with regard to Democratic voters. That was not fully the case, however. The 
number of voters living in counties without landslide victories remained fairly stable over the period 
(Table 2), although with the growth of the electorate the percentage declined – from 61 in 1992 to 
39 in 2016. In 1992, 73 per cent of voters living in a landslide county were in one where the 
Democratic candidate triumphed, but by 2016 that had been reduced to 50 per cent. The number of 
voters living in counties that delivered Republican landslides more than quadrupled over the period, 
at the end of which there was virtual equality between the two parties. There were many more 
Republican than Democrat landslide counties in 2016, therefore, but not many more voters living in 
the former than the latter: the mean number of voters in a Republican landslide county then was 
17,281, compared to 169,872 in a Democrat landslide county; the mean for counties with no 
landslide for either party was 79,938.  
 
Apart from their size, how did the different types of county vary in terms of their population 
characteristics? Bishop suggested that the observed polarization resulted from greater clustering of 
population groups according to income, educational qualifications, religious affiliation and 
observance, ethnicity, immigrant status, and household structure. Census data for c.2010 were 
assembled by county for a range of variables matching those; they refer to the end of the period 
considered and so we anticipated that landslide counties then would be those towards the extremes 
of the various criteria – Democratic landslides in counties with large Black populations, for example.  
 
Table 3 shows that counties that delivered Democrat landslides in 2016 had many more adults with 
degrees than those that delivered Republican landslides; they also had many more Blacks and 
Hispanics in their populations and, as a consequence, many fewer non-Hispanic Whites. Many of 
those census variables have similar geographies (i.e. are inter-correlated), however, and so a clearer 
view of the differences is given by combining the groups of inter-correlated variables through a 
principal components factor analysis. Three (direct-oblimin rotated) factors were extracted (Table 4): 
the first links areas with high levels of persons living in poverty, of unemployed persons, and of 
Blacks with low percentages of non-Hispanic Whites – and vice versa; the second links family 




counties according to their percentage of Hispanics. The mean factor scores on those three 
dimensions are given at the foot of Table 3, with clear contrasts between counties according to 
whether they returned a landslide in 2016, and if so for which party. A large positive mean score 
(1.24) on the first factor shows that counties with Democratic landslides had many more Blacks and 
families in poverty than those that delivered Republican landslides (a mean score of -0.28). There 
were also substantial differences between the Democrat and Republican landslide counties on the 
second and third factors: the means of 0.74 and -0.24 respectively on the second indicate that 
democrat-landslide counties had many more degree-holders and high-income households than 
those returning Republican landslides. Finally, means of -1.10 and 0.18 respectively indicate that the 
Democrat landslide counties had more Hispanics than average (the loading for this variable is 





Counties that delivered landslides for one or other of the two parties’ candidates were concentrated 
in particular states, therefore, and also had characteristic socio-demographic and socio-economic 
profiles. But how important were those two apparent determinants of landslide delivery, and did 
their relative impact differ over time? To address that question, we have fitted a series of multi-level 
multinomial logistic models, with years (seven, 1992-2016) nested within counties (3,077) nested 
within states (49). In these, counties with either a Republican or Democratic landslide are contrasted 
with those where neither party gained a landslide victory at the relevant election. Five models were 
fitted (details are given in the Appendix); each, shown by the reduction in the DIC measure (a 
complexity-penalized badness- of-fit measure), was a substantial improvement on the previous one. 
 
The five models address the following questions: 
1. Were there significant national trends in the number of counties delivering landslide 
victories to either the Republican or the Democratic rather than having no landslide over the 
seven elections? 
2. Within those trends, were there significant variations in the trajectories between states and 
counties? 
3. Were the trajectories related to the county population characteristics with, for example, 
certain types of county more likely than others to have Democratic landslides, and, if so, 
were there still between-state and between-county variations not accounted for by the 
county population characteristics? 
4. Did the impact of a county’s population characteristics on its probability of delivering a 
landslide for one or other of the parties change over time? And 
5. Did the relationships between the probability of a county delivering a landslide for one or 
other of the parties and their population characteristics differ over time? 
 
Model 1: Time Variant Only 
 
In the first model the only predictor is year (Table 5), expressed as the year of the election centred 
on 1992, with the model estimating the probability (actually modelled as a logit) of the county 
delivering either a Republican or a Democratic landslide, contrasted with having no landslide, in each 
year. In the fixed part which gives the general trend, the coefficients for year are statistically 
significant at the 0.001 level or better, showing that the logits of the outcomes have changed over 
time. The logits are converted to probabilities and the modelled trends by year for the mean county 
in the mean state (the so-called population average results Jones and Subramanian, 2017b) are 




landslide and a substantial decrease in the probability of a county not delivering a landslide. For 
Democrat landslides, there is a substantial decline from an already low base. 
 
In the random part of the model, the variances summarize the differences between states and 
between counties within states around the overall trends associated with year.  In this initial model, 
the variances represent the differences over the entire period with the greatest variance at the state 
level for Republicans and for Democrats at the county level. All the variances are large and far away 
from the zero value of no segregation – there is considerable polarization for both parties at both 
state and county level. Figure 3 shows how states differ and what the variance terms are 
summarizing. The horizontal axis shows the differential logit (i.e. the log-odds of the probability) for 
a county within a state delivering a Republican landslide rather than no landslide and the vertical 
axis the comparable differential logit for a Democratic landslide rather than no landslide. The larger 
the positive value the greater the probability that a county in the named state delivered either a 
Republican or a Democratic landslide; the larger the negative value the greater the probability that it 
did not. (There is a large negative correlation of -0.85 between the two sets of logits.) These 
differential logits are large in absolute terms. A Massachusetts county was thus much more likely to 
deliver a Democratic landslide compared to the national average (a logit of 0), for example, while a 
county in Nebraska was much more likely to deliver a Republican landslide.  A clear geographical 
pattern emerges. The states in the upper left quadrant – a positive logit for Democrat landslide and 
a negative one for a Republican landslide – are predominantly in either the New England or Pacific 
divisions; those in the lower right quadrant, especially those furthest to the right, are mainly in the 
Mountain and High Plains parts of the country.  
 
Model 2: State And County Differentials Vary by Time 
 
Model 1 shows that there is substantial polarization over the period; Model 2 additionally assesses 
the extent to which the degree of polarization has changed over the period. It allows the state and 
county differentials to vary by time: instead of identifying a single pattern across all seven elections 
it explores whether trends by states and counties deviate differentially from the national trend over 
the period. 
 
In general the variances indicates growing polarization at both scales (Figure 4). Between states 
(Figure 4a) there is a more than doubling of the variance over the twenty-four years, for both 
parties: increasingly counties within individual states have either a Republican or a Democratic 
landslide. There is also a major increase in the variance within states, between counties (Figure 4b), 
but much more so for Democratic than Republican landslides – at both scales there are growing 
departures from the national trend. The size of the changing differentials at the state level 
summarized by these variances can be appreciated from Figure 5 which shows the trends in the 
logits of a county delivering either a Republican or a Democratic landslide over the period, relative to 
the national trend, which for the Republican party is upward (Figure 5a) and for the Democratic 
party is strongly downwards (Figure 5b); only those states which deviate significantly from the 
national trend are separately identified. For both parties in some states the logits change very little; 
for most of the New England states, plus some on the west coast, there is a substantial negative logit 
for a Republican landslide at each election and a corresponding relatively large logit – though in 
some cases less than zero – for a Democratic landslide. Figure 5a, for example, shows strong upward 
trends, steeper than the national, in a number of southern states – such as Arkansas, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas and West Virginia – as well as Kansas and Missouri 
where the probability of a county returning a Republican landslide increased very substantially. 
Figure 5b shows much steeper declines in the probability of a Democratic landslide than the national 
trend in that same group of states, whereas twelve other states – including California, Connecticut, 




Vermont on the northeast and west coasts – displayed trends departing from the national in the 
opposite direction; the probability of a Democratic landslide there either remained relatively 
constant or increased. Although it is difficult to show graphically a similar process is happening at the 
county level – the variances show that (particularly for Democratic landsides) counties increasingly 
deviated from the general trend of the state to which they belong. States deviated from the national 
trend and counties within states deviated from their state’s overall pattern. Polarization, which was 
very noticeable in 1992 (a logit variance of 14 is very large), became even more marked over time.  
 
Model 3. Introducing Population Characteristics 
 
Models 1 and 2 take no account of differences between counties in their socio-demographic and 
socio-economic characteristics, focusing only on location within states, the extent of the polarization 
and how that was changing. Model 3 extends the analysis, therefore, by introducing the scores on 
the three factors discussed earlier as covariates in the multi-level logistic regressions; it evaluates 
whether there are geographical variations, by states and by counties within states, in the probability 
of a county returning a Republican or Democratic landslide over the period, rather than no landslide, 
once its population characteristics are taken into account. All of the coefficients in the fixed part are 
highly statistically significant (Table 6). Those for year again show a declining probability of a county 
returning a Democratic landslide over the seven elections and a, much larger, probability of a 
Republican landslide. Those for the three factors all show strong relationships between counties 
with Republican or Democrat landslides rather than no landslide. On the first factor the more Blacks 
and families in poverty in a county, the greater the probability of a Democratic landslide; the fewer, 
the greater the probability of a comparable Republican victory. Slightly weaker relationships 
characterise the other factors: a county is more likely to deliver a Democratic landslide, the greater 
the percentage of its residents who have degrees and whose households have high incomes (a 
positive link with Factor 2) and also the more Hispanics who live there (a negative link with Factor 3; 
per cent Hispanic has a negative loading on the factor – Table 4). These clear relationships indicate 
that the composition of a county’s population is a strong determinant of whether it delivered a 
landslide to one of the parties, but the large residual variance values for both state and county 
indicate that population composition represented by the 3 factors is not the sole determinant; there 
are geographical variations in the landslide patterns over and above population composition.  
 
The relative importance of the three factors as determinants of whether a county delivered a 
landslide or not and, if so, to which party is shown by the three graphs in Figure 6, which have the 
same vertical axis so that they are directly comparable The strong relationship with Factor 1 is very 
clear: counties with high positive scores – with large Black and large poverty-stricken household 
populations – are very unlikely not to deliver a landslide and almost certain to provide one for the 
Democrat party’s candidate. With Factor 2, on the other hand, the more affluent counties (large 
percentages of degree holders and high incomes – those with high positive scores) are most likely to 
have delivered a landslide to neither party: Republican candidates were most likely to win by a 
landslide in the least affluent counties and Democrats in the most affluent, but the probability of a 
county not delivering a landslide for either party is more than twice that for a Democratic landslide, 
which in turn is more than twice that for a Republican landslide. Finally, on Factor 3 those with 
fewest Hispanics (high positive scores) were least likely to deliver a landslide: counties with many 
Hispanics were most likely to give the Democratic candidate a resounding majority; those with many 
non-Hispanic Whites were most likely to do so for the Republicans. (This model assumes the effect 
of the factors is unchanging over time – essentially the average effect over the period.)  
 





Model 4 allows the impact of the three factors on whether a county delivered a majority to either 
party to differ over time. All but one of the coefficients in the model’s fixed part are highly 
statistically significant (Table 6): the only exception is the link between Factor 3 and Democrat 
landslides, which because year is centred on 1992, pertain to that year. Importantly, all of the 
interaction terms between the three factors and year do not include a zero effect in their confidence 
intervals which indicates that their effects changed over the period. 
 
These changing effects are best appreciated graphically and  Figure 7 shows the predicted 
probabilities of no landslide and either a Republican or a Democratic landslide for the first (1992), 
median (2004) and final (2016) elections according to a county’s scores on the three factors in 2010; 
in each block of three, the left-hand graph indicates the probability of a county returning no 
landslide, the central graph is the probability of a Republican landslide, and the right-hand graph is 
the probability of a Democratic landslide. For Factor 1 (Figure 7a), the curve of the probabilities has a 
near-normal shape, but with the modal position moving rightwards and lower over time. In 1992, 
there was a probability close to 0.5 that a county with a very small Black population and with few 
households in poverty in c.2010 (i.e. with a large negative factor score) would not deliver a landslide 
to either party; by 2004 that had fallen to c.0.2 and twelve years later to c.0.1. In all three years, on 
the other hand, the probability of a county with a large positive score on that factor not delivering a 
landslide was very low. Similarly, at all three elections the probability of a county with a relatively 
large Black and poor population delivering a Republican landslide was virtually zero (a large positive 
score on Factor 1: the central graph in Figure 7a). However, for counties at the other end of that 
continuum – those with few Blacks and poverty-struck households – the probability of a Republican 
landslide increases substantially, from c.0.5 in 1992 to c.0.9 in 2016. With Democratic landslides, 
however, the pattern was consistent over the period: those with very few Blacks and poor 
households were very unlikely to provide one; those with most Blacks and poor households were 
almost certain to. 
 
On Factor 2 (Figure 7b), the left-hand graph shows that in both 1992 and 2004 there was only a small 
probability of a county delivering a landslide to neither party according to its share of high income 
households and degree-holding adults (there is no clear trend over time). That changed in 2016, 
however, when the probability of a county with few affluent degree-holders (i.e. with a high 
negative score) failing to produce a landslide fell to c.0.15. This shift is reflected in the other two 
graphs. In 1992 the most affluent counties were more likely to deliver a Republican landslide than 
the least affluent; in 2004 and 2016 the situation was not only reversed but also accentuated. The 
least affluent areas were much more likely to deliver a Republican landslide at the end of the period 
– probabilities of c.0.1 in 1992 and 0.85 in 2016 (the central graph in Figure 7b); and the most 
affluent were much more likely to deliver a Democratic landslide in 2016 than 1992 – probabilities of 
c.0.5 and 0.0 respectively (the right-hand graph). 
 
Finally, the trends for Factor 3 (Figure 7c) similarly indicate increased polarization – greater 
probabilities of landslides according to local population characteristics. Those with fewest Hispanics 
and most non-Hispanic Whites (i.e. counties with the highest positive scores in 2010) were more 
likely to have no landslide than those at the opposite end of the continuum, but the probability at 
the right-hand extreme more than halved over the seven elections; by 2016 the probability of a 
county with few Hispanics in 2010 not returning a landslide for either party was c.0.25, compared to 
c.0.60 in 1992. The right-hand graph in Figure 7c shows that counties with high negative scores (i.e. 
large Hispanic populations) were much more likely to deliver a Democratic landslide in 2016 than in 
1992 (indeed at that first election the probability of such a landslide varied only slightly according to 
size of the Hispanic population); by contrast, the central graph shows that those with fewest 
Hispanics and most non-Hispanic Whites (i.e. large positive scores) were much more likely to 





What is the effect of introducing county population characteristics to the models on the separate 
relative importance of state and county as influences on the geographical patterning of landslides? 
Figure 4 showed that the variances in the random parts of Model 2 indicated increased polarization 
both between states and between counties within states over the seven elections. Figure 8 shows 
the changing variances derived from Model 4, with population characteristic influences held 
constant. There is relatively little change between the two models in the between-state variances: in 
Model 2 the variance for both Republican and Democratic landslides increased by c.2.5 times 
between 1992 and 2016 (Figure 4); in Model 4 it increased by c.2.0 times (Figure 8). But there is a big 
change between counties within states: Model 4 suggests that once we account for the changing 
effect of place composition through the factors there is no strong evidence of increasing 
polarization.  In other words, there remains considerable variation between states in the probability 
of a Republican or Democratic landslide once county population characteristics are taken into 
account, with that probability changing over time, but that is not also the case between counties 
within states. The micro-geography of polarization – of a growing number of landslides – between 
counties is largely a function of their socio-economic and -demographic characteristics. But the 
macro-geography, at the state scale, is not simply a function of those characteristics: some states are 
more likely to have counties returning landslides for one of the two parties than others, whatever 
their counties’ population characteristics. It must be stressed, however, that county level 
polarization remains large (a variance for the logits of around 14 is very sizable) but we have 
accounted for increasing within-state between-county polarization by the varying trajectories of 
counties with differing socio-economic characteristics.  
 
Model 5. Time-Specific Trends. 
 
In this final stage we fitted models separately for each year to explore further the changing patterns 
(the voluminous output is not reported here). The findings are summarised in the nine graphs in 
Figure 9 which show the probabilities of each outcome – Republican landslide, Democratic landslide, 
no landslide – according to the values on each factor score, identifying each year separately and with 
the same vertical axis. 
 
On Factor 1 there is little difference cross the seven elections: the greater the percentage of a 
county’s population that is Black, the greater the percentage unemployed and the greater the 
percentage in poverty the smaller the probability of a Republican landslide (virtually zero for those 
counties with the highest positive scores), and the greater the probability of a Democratic landslide 
– from virtually zero to virtually 1.0 across the full spread of factor scores. Counties with no landslide 
are clustered around the mean for that factor. 
 
The graphs for the other two factors indicate noticeable changes in the geography over the 24-year 
period. On factor 2, counties with high negative scores have relatively few people with degrees and 
relatively low median incomes; in 1992 and 2004 such counties were very unlikely to deliver a 
Republican landslide (probabilities of less than 0.1) whereas those at the other extreme – with many 
degree-holders and high-income households – were as likely as not (probabilities of c.0.5). At the 
later elections, on the other hand, the direction of the trend changes: areas with high negative 
scores are increasingly unlikely to deliver a Republican landslide whereas those with high positive 
scores were not. In the late twentieth century affluent counties were quite likely to provide the 
Republican party with landslide victories; by the second decade of the twenty-first they were not. 
This switch is mirrored by the probabilities of a Democratic landslide: early in the period the least 
affluent areas were quite likely to provide the Democratic party’s candidate with a landslide victory; 
by the end of the period, the probability of a county delivering such a landslide was greatest in the 





Finally, on Factor 3 counties dominated by non-Hispanic Whites in 2012 – those with the highest 
positive scores – were increasingly likely to deliver a landslide to the Republican party whereas those 
with large Hispanic populations – those with the highest negative scores – were increasingly likely to 
deliver a Democratic landslide; the probability at the extreme left of the continuum changing from 
c.0.3 in 1992 to c.0.9 in 2016. As the Hispanic population grew (from around 22 million in 1992 to 
nearly 57 million in 2015), with 61 per cent voting for Bill Clinton according to the exit polls in 1992 
and 65 per cent for Hillary Clinton in 2016, so the areas where they were concentrated, mainly in the 
southwest, Florida and some of the biggest metropolitan areas (notably New York), were more likely 




The maps of voting at United States’ presidential elections from 1992 on provide clear evidence of a 
growing geographical polarization of the country’s electorate, as evidenced by Bishop’s chosen 
indicator of such polarization – counties where one of the two parties’ candidates won over the 
other by more than 20 percentage points, what he termed a landslide. In 1992 more than 63 per 
cent of all counties were won by less than a landslide; twenty-four years later that percentage had 
fallen to just 20. The main beneficiary of this change was the Republican party: its candidate won by 
a landslide in just 19 per cent of the counties in 1992 but in 72 per cent of them in 2016; the 
Democratic party experienced a decline, however, winning 17 per cent of the counties by a landslide 
in 1992 but only 7 per cent in 2016. The map became predominantly red as the Republicans came to 
dominate the election outcomes across much of the country to the west of the Appalachians. But 
that spatial advantage was not reflected numerically, because many of the counties the Republicans 
predominated in had relatively few voters: in 2016, 30 per cent of all those who voted lived in 
Republican landslide counties and a further 30 per cent in Democratic landslide counties. The 
country became polarized spatially and also numerically. 
 
That polarization has been brought about, according to Bishop (2009), through sorting processes 
associated with selective migration; households and families with similar characteristics – in their 
ethnicity, socio-economic status, incomes etc. – have increasingly clustered together in the same 
areas: spatial segregation has produced political polarization. But what underpins that increased 
polarization; are the landslides the result only of spatial patterns of segregation, of each party’s 
supporters being increasingly clustered into different places, or are other geographical factors 
involved – is the polarization greater in some states than others, irrespective of their population 
composition? 
 
Multi-level modelling has been deployed here to address that question, exploring the geography of 
the counties that returned landslides for each of the two parties using voting data at seven 
presidential elections and census data illustrating the main features of their population composition 
at the end of the period. Within the clear trends over time, this has shown that counties with large 
Black populations, with high percentages of unemployed and of families living in poverty had high 
probabilities of delivering landslides for the Democratic party candidates; those with large Hispanic 
populations also had high, and increasing, probabilities of returning a landslide for the Democratic 
party. Those patterns were consistent across the seven elections, but the analyses also showed a 
major switch with regard to one other aspect of local population structure. At the beginning of the 
period (basically the 1992, 1996 and 2000 elections) counties with relatively large higher-status 
populations (with high median family incomes and percentages of their adult populations with 
degrees) were more likely to produce a landslide victory for the Republican than for the Democratic 
party candidate; at the later elections the reverse was true – the more affluent areas were more 




Republican. This trend was established by the start of the twenty-first century and Trump’s victory 
was an accentuation of it, rather than a clear deviation from existing patterns. 
 
Those findings suggest that compositional factors were crucial determinants of the increasingly 
polarized electoral geography – who lived where determined whether the Republicans or Democrats 
won the county by a landslide. But they did not account for all of the variation; there were additional 
geographies that were more place- than people-specific. The New England states plus many counties 
on the northeastern seaboard stood apart, for example, with relatively few landslides delivered for 
either party, as did parts of the Upper Midwest until 2016. A majority of counties in the Mountain 
and southern states, other than those in the latter region with large Black and/or Hispanic 
populations, on the other hand, returned Republican landslides at the later elections – probably a 
reflection of the party’s increased attraction to Evangelical Christians, 81 per cent of whom voted for 
Trump in 2016. (Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Oklahoma and Tennessee have the largest 
concentrations of Evangelical Protestants according to the Pew Research Centre.3) 
 
The ideological polarization of the US electorate has been paralleled in recent decades by a spatial 
polarization – at presidential elections a rapidly-increasing number of counties have returned 
landslide victories for the Republican party and although the number of counties delivering similar 
landslides favouring the Democratic party candidates, as many electors live in counties where there 
have been Democratic landslides as where there has been similar domination by the Republican 
party. Throughout the period studied here, counties with relatively large Black, poor, unemployed 
and Hispanic populations have been most likely to deliver landslides for the Democrats while those 
with large non-White populations have been most likely to favour the Republicans. But alongside 
those stable patterns there has also been a significant shift: in the 1990s, counties with relatively 
large percentages of degree-holders and of families with high median incomes were more likely to 
return Republican than Democratic landslides: two decades later, the reverse was the case, 
indicating a major switch in the country’s electoral geography. But population characteristics did not 
account for all of the variation in the geography of landslides. Even when those characteristics were 
taken into account in the multi-level modelling, there remained significant between-state and 
between-county, within-state variations – variations that changed over time; further evidence of an 
increasingly complex electoral geography that the modelling undertaken here has explored and 
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Table 1. The number of landslide counties at each Presidential election, 1992-2016. 
 
Election No Landslide Republican Democratic Total 
1992 1963 588 526 3077 
1996 1923 610 544 3077 
2000 1457 1428 192 3077 
2004 1222 1692 163 3077 
2008 1354 1397 326 3077 
2012 1091 1716 270 3077 
2016 631 2217 229 3077 
 
Table 2. Total number of voters in Landslide and Non-Landslide Counties 
 
Election Neither Republican Democrat Total . 
1992 51,220,295 8,510,223 23,462,140 83,192,568 
1996 49,726,147 7,971,081 28,115,946 85,812,724 
2000 55,733,983 21,889,521 23,332,700 100,956,204 
2004 62,886,776 32,845,280 24,784,729 120,516,785 
2008 66,596,774 22,038,784 40,142,371 128,777,929 
2012 62,368,779 28,184,145 35,609,789 126,163,713 







Table 3. Mean and standard deviation values for Landslide and Non-Landslide counties on various 
population characteristics 
Variable Neither Republican Democrat Total 
Per cent Degree 22.8 (9.5) 16.4 (5.7) 27.6 (14.1) 18.6 (8.4) 
Per cent in Poverty 15.5 (7.0) 15.0 (5.5) 19.6 (10.7) 15.4 (6.5) 
Median Family Income 46,044  40,421 46,072 41,988 
 (11,713) (7,426) (16,849) (9,749) 
Per cent Unemployed 7.7 (3.0) 6.5 (2.8) 9.1 (4.6) 6.9 (3.1) 
Percent aged 65+ 14.3 (3.5) 16.8 (4.1) 12.6 (3.1) 16.0 (4.1) 
Per cent Black 15.2 (17.7) 5.2 (8.4) 25.0 (27.1) 8.7 (14.3) 
Per cent Hispanic 9.6 (14.2) 6.9 (10.5) 18.5 (25.2) 8.3 (13.3) 
Per cent Black/Hispanic 24.8 (19.7) 12.2 (13.3) 43.5 (27.8) 17.1 (18.5) 
Per cent non-Hispanic White 69.9 (19.8) 84.6 (13.8) 46.5 (25.0) 78.8 (19.5) 
Factor 1 0.43 (1.05) -0.28 (0.70) 1.24 (1.59) -0.02 (1.00) 
Factor 2 0.48 (1.10) -0.24 (0.75) 0.74 (1.60) -0.02 (1.00) 
Factor 3 -0.19 (1.03) 0.18 (0.80) -1.10 (1.69) 0.01 (1.00) 
 
 
Table 4. Loadings from a principal components factor analysis of the county-level population 
characteristics 
 
Rotated factor 1 2  3 
Per cent Degree -0.14 0.86 -0.05 
Per cent in Poverty 0.67 -0.62 -0.30 
Median Family Income -0.24 0.93 0.09 
Per cent Unemployed 0.76 -0.31 -0.11 
Per cent 65< -0.48 -0.51 0.39 
Per cent Black 0.85 -0.05 -0.10 
Per cent Hispanic 0.01 0.02 -0.96 







Table 5. The results of fitting Models 1 and 2, showing the coefficients and their credible intervals 
(CIs) for the fixed part and the variances with their credible intervals for the random part 
 
Model  1   2 
 2.5%CI Coeff. 97.5%CI 2.5%CI Coeff. 97.5%CI 
Fixed part 
Constant: Republican -5.80 -4.70 -3.65 -6.22 -5.02 -3.90 
Constant: Democrat -4.80 -3.91 -3.04 -6.07 -4.94 -3.86 
Year: Republican 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.19 0.26 0.31 
Year: Democrat -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.33 -0.25 -0.18 
Random part 
State level 
Variance: Republican 7.93 13.15 21.20 8.33 14.18 23.34 
Variance: Democrat 4.76 8.10 13.16 6.54 11.38 18.78 
Variance: Year-Republican    0.02 0.04 0.06 
Variance: Year-Democrat    0.03 0.05 0.08 
County level 
Variance: Republican 8.90 9.86 10.90 11.42 13.41 15.63 
Variance: Democrat 11.10 12.95 15.02 18.17 22.53 27.53 
Variance: Year-Republican    0.03 0.03 0.04 
Variance: Year-Democrat    0.05 0.06 0.08 







Table 6. The results of fitting Models 3 and 4, showing the coefficients and their credible intervals 
(CIs) for the fixed part and the variances with their credible intervals for the random part 
 
 
Model  3   4 
 2.5%CI Coeff. 97.5%CI 2.5%CI Coeff. 97.5%CI 
Fixed part 
Constant: Republican -8.15 -6.45 -4.85 -6.79 -5.47 -4.24 
Constant: Democrat -7.21 -5.87 -4.57 -5.59 -4.42 -3.29 
Year: Republican 0.26 0.30 0.36 0.21 0.26 0.31 
Year: Democrat -0.13 -0.05 0.01 -0.32 -0.25 -0.19 
Factor 1: Republican -4.06 -3.74 -3.44 -2.76 -2.40 -2.05 
Factor 1: Democrat 2.93 3.28 3.66 2.06 2.42 2.81 
Factor 2: Republican -1.24 -1.04 -0.84 0.76 0.97 1.17 
Factor 2: Democrat 0.33 0.62 0.92 -1.43 -1.15 -0.87 
Factor 3: Republican 0.67 0.89 1.13 -0.61 -0.34 -0.08 
Factor 3: Democrat -1.53 -1.23 -0.94 -0.19 -0.50 0.11 
Year.F1: Republican    -0.12 -0.10 -0.08 
Year.F1: Democrat    0.08 0.11 0.14 
Year.F2: Republican    -0.14 -0.13 -0.12 
Year.F2: Democrat    0.13 0.15 0.17 
Year.F3: Republican    0.07 0.08 0.10 
Year.F3: Democrat    -0.12 -0.10 -0.08 
Random part 
State level 
Variance: Republican 18.02 30.56 49.86 10.34 17.58 28.68 
Variance: Democrat 9.82 13.63 26.27 7.92 13.36 21.58 
Variance: Year-Republican 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.04 
Variance: Year-Democrat 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.05 
County level 
Variance: Republican 18.20 21.18 24.49 8.96 10.54 12.33 
Variance: Democrat 22.43 27.71 33.88 14.37 17.81 21.93 
Variance: Year-Republican 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Variance: Year-Democrat 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.03 






Figure 1. Counties according to the number of landslides delivered to the Republican and Democratic 








Figure 2. The changing probability of a Republican landslide, a Democratic landslide, or no landslide 




















































Figure 3. The differential logits for a county returning a Republican and a Democratic landslide, as 







































































































Figure 4. The changing variances for counties returning a Republican or a Democratic landslide by (a) 




































Figure 5a. The changing logit of a county in a state returning a Republican landslide according to 
































































Figure 5b. The changing logit of a county in a state returning a Democratic landslide according to 






























































Figure 6. The probability of a county returning a Republican landslide, a Democratic landslide or no 
landslide according to their values on the three population characteristic factors, according to Model 
3. 



































































Figure 7. The probabilities of a county returning no landslide (the left-hand column), a Republican 
landslide (the central column) or a Democratic landslide (the left-hand column) in 1992, 2004 and 
2016, according to their values on the three population characteristic factors, according to Model 4. 
 
   
 











































































































































































































































































































Figure 8. The changing variances for counties returning a Republican or a Democratic landslide by (a) 
state (the left-hand graph) and (b) by county within state (the right-hand graph), with their values of 
the population characteristic factors held constant, according to Model 4. 
 




















Figure 9. The probabilities of a county returning a Republican landslide, a Democratic landslide, or no 
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APPENDIX: MODEL SPECIFICATIONS AND ESTIMATION   
This appendix sets out the details of the models applied and briefly considers how they estimated 
as Bayesian models. 
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The observed response variable (𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘) is a set of three outcomes with either a 1 or 0 representing 
whether a county was not a landslide, a Republican landslide or a Democrat landside signified by 
the superscript N, R and D. This is a closed-number set (Evans and Jones 1981) as a county can 
only be in one category and we consequently we model this as a multinomial distribution where 
we are interested in the underlying probability of the outcome (𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑘 ) which must sum to 1 across 
the three potential responses. The subscripts (ijk) indicate that we are dealing with a multilevel 
structure with repeated measures for years (at level 1) nested within counties at level 2 and 
States at level 3. In practice (to avoid impossible predictions and achieve more plausible model 
assumptions), we choose the No landslide outcome as the referent group and model the log-odds 
(the logits) of the other two outcomes in relation to that.4  
 
This results in two wings of an equation with the outcome being the log odds of a Republican 
landslide compared to No landslide in one wing and the log-odds of being a Democratic landslide 
compared to No Landslide in the other. In the fixed part of this multilevel model (Jones, 1991), 
there is one predictor in both wings – the year the election took place.5 As this variable is 
modelled as a difference from 1992 (the earliest year included in the analysis), the terms 
associated with the 𝛽0 and 𝛽1 give the log-odds of each outcome in that year. The two slope 
terms (𝛽2 and 𝛽3) give the change in the log-odds for a unit change in the variable year. In each of 
the wings there is therefore a general overall trend summarised by an intercept and an overall 
slope, (𝛽0and 𝛽2 for the logit of Republican landslides). Additionally, in each wing there are 
allowed-to-vary departures at both the state and the county level (the so- called random 
                                                          
4 It seems natural to use no landslide as a base but it is worth stressing that is possible to drive all the terms of 
both alternative specifications (averages and variances) without refitting the models. Thus 𝛽(𝐷|𝑅) =
 𝛽(𝐷|𝑁) − 𝛽(𝑁|𝑅). 
5 Given the complexities that come later we have simply specified an overall trend across the 1992-2016 




intercepts), so that 𝑣0is the state logit departure from the general line for Republican landslides, 
while 𝑢0is the county logit departure from the state, again for Republicans.  If the former is 
positive there is a greater chance of a Republican landslide in that state than nationally; if the 
latter is negative then that county has a lower chance of such a landslide in comparison to the 
state it is in. 
 
These logit departures are assumed in the random part of the to be normally distributed and are 
summarised by variance terms at the state and county level (the loge transformation of the odds 
making the normality assumption more plausible). Thus, the variance 𝜎𝑣0
2   summarises the state 
differentials for Republican landslides and if this term is zero there is no differences in this 
outcome at this level. Similarly. σu1
2  summarises the within state, between county differences for 
Democratic landslides. A large value for these variances means there is a strong geography in the 
outcome – where you are matters in terms of landslides.  The off-diagonal covariances terms 
(once standardised) summarize the degree of correlation at a particular level for the two types of 
departure so that 𝜎𝑣1𝑣2 measures the association between the logit departures for Republican 
and Democratic landslides at the state level. (This is not a forgone conclusion as the inbuilt 
correlation is not at this level.) The final part of the equation specifies a variance covariance of an 
exact multinomial distribution at lowest level for the residual variation after taking account of the 
terms in the fixed part of the model and the higher-level random terms. The variances in this 
matrix are the underlying probability of an outcome multiplied by its complement while the 
covariances reflect the inbuilt negative correlation between this closed number set.  
 
More Complex Models  
 
Subsequent models build on the above and can be more complex by adding terms to the fixed 
part and to the random part. The second model builds on the first in allowing the differential 
effects at the State and County levels to change with year. It answers the question of whether 
state and/or county geography is becoming more important over time – i.e. the extent and nature 
of the polarization around the overall trend and gives us the changing between county and state 
variation that needs to be explained. Model three additionally includes the three factors in the 
fixed part while model four additionally includes year by factor interactions to assess the changing 
effect of factors on the outcomes. 
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The basic form of the model remains the same with a three-level multinomial structure (to make 
the equations more compact the subscripts are dropped where they are obvious), however the 
two wings for the logits are considerably expanded. Each wing now has four observed variables: 
the year centred around 1992 and the three factors scores (F1, F2, F3) centred around their grand 
mean; and there are interactions between each factor and year. Because of the centering 𝛽0 is 
the logit of a Republican landslide in 1992 in a county which is average on all three factors. The 
slope term 𝛽2 gives the change in this logit for an increase of a year in an average place while the 
slope 𝛽4 gives the main effect for factor 1 in 1992 and there are similar slope terms for factors 
two and three. The rest of the fixed part of the model is the slopes for the interactions between 
factor and year so that 𝛽14respresents the change in the Republican logit for a combination of 
year and factor 3. The same elaboration is performed in the Democrat wing of the model. Both 
wings have additional sets of random terms at both the state and county level. Thus, 𝑣0𝑘is the 
Republican logit differential intercept at the state level and gives whether the state is 
differentially high or low in 1992 once account is taken of population characteristics through the 
inclusion of the three factors.   In a similar fashion, 𝑣1𝑘is the Republican logit differential slope 
associated with year; a positive value indicating that the state has a steeper differential rise 
compared to the overall average trend after taking account of the potential changing effect of the 
factors.  
In total, there are four random differentials at the state and county representing differential 
intercepts and slopes for Republican and Democratic landslides. These differentials are again 
summarised in variance-covariance terms at each level. Thus 𝜎𝑣0
2   summarises the state 
differentials for Republican landslides in 1992 and if this term is zero there are no differences in 
this outcome at the state level. The variance term 𝜎𝑣2
2   summarises the state differential slopes 
and if this term is zero the states follow the national trend and do not depart from it. The 
covariance terms are important with for example 𝜎𝑣0𝑣2 giving the association between the 
differential logit for Republicans at the state level in 1992 with the differential slope over the 
period. These terms combined in a quadratic equation to define a variance function; thus (Bullen 
et al, 1997) for the logits for Republicans at the state level it is: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑣0𝑘 + 𝑣2𝑘(𝑌𝑟 − 92)) =  𝜎𝑣𝑜
2  + 2𝜎𝑣0𝑣2(𝑌𝑟 − 92) + 𝜎𝑣2
2 (𝑌𝑟 − 92)2  
 If the covariance term is positive there is evidence of increasing polarization over time.  
Although these models are based on the logits it is possible to derive estimated probabilities. This if often 







The models are estimated as Full Bayesian models using the MLwiN software with Markov-Chain 
Monte-Carlo procedures (Jones and Subramanian,2017; Charlton et al, 2017). The default priors 
(Browne, 2017) are used to impart as little information as possible to the estimates. There are 
several reasons for doing this: quasi-likelihood procedures are known to underestimate the 
higher-level variances; Full Bayes procedures take account of uncertainty in all parameters both 
fixed and random simultaneously; asymptotic normality is not assumed for the estimates of the 
variance parameters and the derived credible intervals (Bayesian confidence intervals) can be 
asymmetric. Finally, these procedures allow the calculation of a Bayesian Deviance Information 
Criterion (Spiegelhalter, 2002) which is a complexity-penalized badness-of-fit measure where 
complexity is estimated and takes account of the number of parameters in the fixed and random 
parts of the model. It is now common practice that a reduction of 10 or greater when two models 
are compared reflects a substantial improvement in the goodness of fit. We followed Draper’s 
(2008) good practice guidelines in determining when the simulations chains have been run for 
long enough. We also used the MLwiN software to calculate cluster-specific and population 
average probability predictions from the logits (Rasbash et al., 2017); the latter take account of 
the random effects.  
